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traditional in method, subject-matter and conceptualization."' The adjective "interdisciplinary" has been a vogue word for some time now and may even be considered passe in some circles, an outworn relic of the curricular faddism and mania for "innovation" which swept the academic world in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Moreover, there is a vocal lobby within the discipline, preoccupied with "professional identity,"2 which is militantly committed to defending the "autonomy" of historiography against intercourse with other branches of science and scholarship, especially in the form of quantitative research. 3 To a large degree, the history of twentiethcentury history has been one of struggle between defenders of traditional attitudes established in the nineteenth century (when historians claimed to have emancipated themselves from literature and speculative philosophy) and reformers who self-consciously seek to revolutionize the profession. To date, the conservatives, though perhaps not always as inflexible as the most extreme, are still numerically in the ascendency.
II.
"Interdisciplinary history" means historical scholarship which makes use of the methods or concepts of one or more disciplines other than history. "Discipline"-in the sense of"a branch of instruction or education; a department of learning or knowledge"-is a very old term in English. The earliest use cited by the Oxford English Dictionary comes from the prologue to Chaucer's "Yeoman's Tale" (1386): "Assaye in myn absence this disciplyne and this crafty science." The term derives from the word "disciple" (Latin disciplina) and the idea of "instruction imparted to disciples or scholars." In the vocabulary of twentieth-century academic life the word normally refers to the specialized fields into which instruction and research have been divided in modern university curricula. 4 The term "interdisciplinary" is of considerably more recent vintage. The OED defines it as "Of or pertaining to two or more disciplines of learning; contributing to or benefitting from two or more disciplines," and cites a sociological article published in 1937 as the earliest instance of its use. 5 Nowadays, the term "interdisciplinary" has become common to members of every academic discipline. It has been made familiar in innumerable discussions, and is quite often used to connote something desired, something worthy of achieving in teaching and scholarship. It has become a topical word because of growing fear that the specialized disciplines have seriously narrowed the intellectual outlook of those engaged in teaching and research in their own field of Interdisciplinary History 429 knowledge. The word embodies a call to cure this situation, to counteract the baleful results of over-specialization. On reflection, however, it is clear that less specialization is not a possible solution, for it is this very drive towards specialization since the start of the nineteenth century which today has given us precise and accurate knowledge in all of our academic disciplines. The growth of significant knowledge depends upon an accumulation of more and more complex bodies of information, and these bodies of information in turn are the results of more and more complex methods of analysis. What all of this points to is the fact that interdisciplinary teaching and research should not be understood as a way of replacing specialization, but as a new kind of specialization which builds on and integrates the specializations of the discrete disciplines.
American-trained historians have used the term "interdisciplinary" since at least the early 1950s. 6 The expression "interdisciplinary history" became fashionable in the 1960s, and was endowed with a measure of professional acceptance with the founding of The Journal of Interdisciplinary History in 1970 (a methodologically related journal, Comparative Studies in Society and History, had already been founded in 1958). The underlying concept of interdisciplinary history considerably antedates introduction of the term itself, however. In order to understand the rise and development of the concept of interdisciplinary history it is helpful to say something about the traditional model of historical scholarship established in the nineteenth century.
Nineteenth-century historical research, allowing for notable exceptions such as Jacob Burckhardt's famous Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, was strongly and narrowly oriented toward politics, the evolution of institutions, the role of political personalities, and the narration of discrete events-what the turn-of-the-century French scholar Paul Lacombe dubbed "l'histoire gvenementielle" (the "history of events"). The situation was aptly reflected in E. A. Freeman's famous opinion that history is simply "past politics." Though historians did not completely ignore the non-political aspects of the pastsocial structure and development, cultural affairs, the history of thought, etc.-they tended to treat them "for the most part as an impressionistic 'backcloth,' roughly sketched in, against which the drama of political events was played out.'" The tradition of equating history with the narration of political events is, of course, ancient; it reaches back to historiographical models established by Thucydides and Polybius, to the Greco-Roman notion that history's chief purpose is to provide political lessons for future statesmen, and to the theory of historical understanding found in Aristotle's Poetics, 430 T.C.R. Horn and Harry Ritter according to which history (in contrast to the higher occupations of poetry and philosophy) deals with particular events rather than general truth. This venerable tradition was powerfully reinforced in the early nineteenth century, at precisely the time history was establishing itself as an academic profession as opposed to a gentleman's avocation or pursuit for active or retired politicians. The new business of academic historiography, which emerged first in the universities and archives of Germany and France, was based on the close analysis of written documents, and the kind of documentation most readily available to disciplinary "role models" such as Leopold von Ranke and Fustel de Coulanges was political and diplomatic. This naturally conditioned the kind of history they wrote.
Moreover, these early continental historians, men who set standards for the later professionalization of history in England and the United States, were bureaucrats whose job was to provide their countries with historical pedigrees and national heroes, so it is hardly surprising that their work focused on political and institutional matters. The rank-and-file scholars who followed in the footsteps of pioneers such as Ranke and Fustel were, by and large, uninterested in the underlying epistemological problems of their new science; they were primarily engaged in the collection and organization of facts, and in the publication of scholarly monographs on carefully delimited topics. The spirit of patient caution and fact-grubbing empiricism which animated research is well illustrated in a statement of 1876 by the French scholar Gabriel Monod:
We have understood the danger of premature generalizations, of great a priori systems that claim to cover everything and explain everything. We have sensed that history should be the object of a slow methodical process of investigation in which one moves gradually from the particular to the general, from details to the whole; where all obscure points are successively illuminated in order to have the whole picture and to be able to base general ideas, susceptible to proof and verification, upon groups of established facts.8
In the late nineteenth century, German philosophers such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm Windelband, and Heinrich Rickert developed a neo-idealist theory of historical knowledge which in some ways dovetailed with the assumptions of non-theoretical, "working" historians. This theory was founded on a radical distinction between the "natural" and "cultural" sciences (Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften).9 According to the classic formulations of Windelband and Rickert, the natural sciences were "nomothetic," i.e., con-Interdisciplinary History 431 cerned with the systematic search for general laws of physical nature, whereas the cultural sciences (notably history) were "idiographic," i.e., they sought to understand human affairs in terms of the unique, non-repeatable contexts in which they occurred, rather than in terms of generalizations and regularities. The ultimate task of history was the largely intuitive and empathetic "understanding" (Verstehen) of particular and unique events, situations, and personalities of the past. Thus, history was set off clearly from natural science, something which flattered historians' sense that they were engaged in a distinctly special and "autonomous" kind of work. History was still considered a "science," it was simply a very different kind of science than, say, chemistry or physics. This theory continues to exert a strong influence on the self-image of many historians today, although the radical distinction between "nomothetic" and "idiographic" forms of knowledge is now widely discredited.'
III.
It is against this background that the rise of the concept of interdisciplinary history must be understood. Key manifestations of the idea at the turn of the twentieth century were, in Germany, the work of Karl Lamprecht (1856-1915); in France, the movement for historical "synthesis" founded by Henri Berr (1863-1954); and, in the United States, the crusade for a "New History" led by James Harvey Robinson (1863-1936). In each case we find a self-conscious rebellion against the prevailing orthodoxy that the historian is basically a narrator of particular events which occurred in the past and against the belief that history is a discrete kind of inquiry whose methods, goals, and purposes differ in kind from those of natural science. In each case it was claimed that history must borrow ideas from other fields, especially from the new family of empirical "social sciences" being institutionalized in the 1880s and 1890s. It should also be noted that each of the turn-of-the-century appeals for interdisciplinary cooperation, and especially that of Berr, was in some direct or indirect way indebted to the mental orientation known as "positivism," an outlook associated particularly with the name of the mid-nineteenth century French social theorist August Comte. Comte and his historiographical followers (notably H. T. Buckle in England) believed that history could, and should, be placed on the same epistemological plane as the natural sciences, which Comte idealized for their capacity to proceed from the empirical analysis of observable phenomena to the formulation of universal laws. In the late nineteenth century, Comte's philosophy was widely discredited among historians and 432 T.C.R. Horn and Harry Ritter many others, including the neo-idealist philosophers, but his conviction that all paths to knowledge are essentially similar persisted and became a basic assumption of the first generation of interdisciplinary historians.
Karl Lamprecht was an idiosyncratic and astoundingly prolific German historian who taught at the University of Leipzig from 1891 to his death in 1915. Lamprecht used the term "cultural history" (Kulturgeschichte) as an umbrella label to designate his idea of a comprehensive approach to the study of the past, based on a potpourri of the findings and concepts of traditional history, economics, art history, and psychology-especially the psychology of Wilhelm Wundt and Theodor Lipps. The Leipzig scholar was among those late nineteenth-century intellectuals who, in the face of growing specialization, "felt the need for a more systematic and comprehensive view Sof all new knowledge and diversified concerns"; his basic question was "how could the history of the many diverse activities of man be brought together in one unifed form and intelligible structure?"" He regarded psychology as especially important, and defined his version of cultural history as "the comparative history of the factors of socio-psychic development."'2 For psychology to be genuinely useful for historians, however, he believed that it must be transformed into a collective "social psychology," one which focused on groups and situations rather than single personalities. In 1905 he formulated the basic principle of his orientation: "Modern historical science is above all a social-psychological science."'3 To this fundamental principle, Lamprecht wedded the eighteenth-century concept of Volksgeist ("national spirit") and made this idea, which he re-christened Volkseele ("national psyche"), the fundamental object of his research. His grandiose, twenty-one volume Deutsche Geschichte (1891-1915) was designed to trace the course of development of the collective German psyche through a progression of stages from antiquity to the present. He believed it would ultimately be possible to write a general history of the psychic development of mankind which would exhibit a universal pattern; for the moment, however, historians would have to begin with individual histories of national psychic development.
Lamprecht's unorthodox ideas provoked a furious and often not very edifying Methodenstreit among German historians prior to World War I, and these ideas were eventually totally discredited as "eclectic trifling."'4 It is only since the 1960s that a new generation of historians in West Germany, itself in conscious revolt against traditional ideas, has taken a renewed interest in his theory; even now his approach is viewed essentially as a matter of antiquarian curiosity. It is generally agreed that Lamprecht's vision was too vast for the History's chances of getting ahead and of doing good are dependent on its refraining from setting itself off as a separate discipline and undertaking to defend itself from the encroachments of seemingly hostile sciences which now and then appear within its territory. .... The bounds of all departments of human research and speculation are inherently provisional, indefinite, and fluctuating; moreover, the lines of demarcation are hopelessly interlaced .... Each so-called science or discipline is ever and always dependent on other sciences and disciplines. It draws its life from them, and to them it owes, consciously or unconsciously, a great part of its chances of progress.17
Another champion of the new approach, Harry Elmer Barnes, sought to bring the community of historical scholars abreast of the latest developments in the various fields of social science.'8 Others prominently associated with the movement at different times were Charles Beard, James T. Shotwell, Conyers Read, Frederick J. Teggart, and Crane Brinton. For these men, the expression "New History" became a battle-cry which designated a "synthetic," present-oriented, pragmatic approach to the past which was pitted, often quite belligerently, against the "political fetish" of late nineteenth-century historiography. 19 The impact of the New History on historical studies in the United 434
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States was much greater than the impact of the isolated Lamprecht's ideas on German historiography. As a label for innovators, it is true, the term began to lose favor in the mid-1930s, when the movement as a whole became discredited due to its association with presentism, relativism and "indiscriminate eclecticism."20 Since 1945 much of the commentary on the movement has been critical and ironic in tone, 21 and it is probably true that the achievements of the New History were more notable in the sphere of manifestoes and programmatic statements than in the production of works which actually demonstrated its ideas in practice. Still, the New History unquestionably helped to reorient thinking and pave the way for a broader and more methodo- Lovejoy's journal became a forum for interdisciplinary work by historians, students of political theory, literary critics, and philosophers, and the "history of ideas" helped to popularize the "American studies" approach to United States history, which brought together historians and historically-oriented literary critics. The movement had some impact on university curricula in the 1950s and 1960s, when a number of American studies programs were founded across the country.
At the time Lovejoy was launching his journal, a development took place in analytical philosophy which held considerable promise for history, particularly for the interdisciplinary study of the history of history itself; that promise has yet to be fully realized. This was the establishment of a branch of philosophy which has come to be called "critical philosophy of history," and its birth was signaled by the publication of two studies: Maurice Mandelbaum's The Problem of Historical Knowledge (1938) and Carl G. Hempel's "Laws and Explanation in History" (1942). These essays shifted the focus of discussion in philosophy of history from the "speculative" planei.e., the question of the "meaning" of history (understood as the entire course of human events) to the "analytical" level, i.e., the epistemological foundations of history (understood as a scholarly activity). Hempel's article, in particular, caused a vigorous debate over the nature of historical reasoning, centering around the question of whether or not historians ultimately depend (as Hempel argued) on an appeal to general laws for their explanations. Most historians ignored the debate, either because they had been conditioned to believe (partly as the result of the work of Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, and Croce, more as a consequence of non-theoretical training in the so-called "Rankean method") that general laws had no place in history on any level; because they believed (with much justification) that most analytical philosophers were actually not acquainted with the way historians traditionally work; or because they believed that the whole question of the grounds of historical knowledge was irrelevant to the writing of good history. The British historian G. R. Elton voiced a widespread opinion when he said that "a philosophic concern with such problems as the reality of historical In principle, then, the question of whether or not the historian should use the ideas and methods of other fields is no longer at issue. The question is, rather, how well the historian selects and makes use of those concepts and techniques.
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